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ABSTRACT
After the Zombie Apocalypse, the ROUNZ [Rest Of Us Non-Zombie] settlements will need
to redevelop institutions to allocate scarce resources within their own communities, both
for internal economic growth and for providing defense against the Zombie attackers.
The problem for the settlements will be how to allocate the scarce goods as well as
how to allocate the risks. More likely than not, groups will initially develop systems of
command and control. Some person or group will gain a monopoly over the use of force,
using some combination of charisma and fear as a motivator.
The important long-term outcome will be that those settlements that create and
enforce private property rights and enforceable contracts, albeit within a governing
system relying on a monopoly over the use of force, will be likely to emerge more dominant
over the long run. The evidence from the past two centuries [pre-Zombie apocalypse]
shows that time and again, no matter who wins the wars, economies based on enforceable
property rights, legal entitlements, and enforceable contracts tend to become dominant.
Keywords Zombie, law, economics, monopoly, contract , property, efficiency

1. INTRODUCTION
Nearly every apocalypse novel ever written predicts and describes a breakdown of law
and order, including the loss of enforceable property rights and the lack of an enforcement
mechanism for contracts, not to mention murder, rape, and cannibalism.1
Some characters in the novels were prepared for lengthy periods of deprivation,
either because they saw a disaster coming or because they were by nature more risk
averse 2 or forward-looking 3 and hence more inclined to save. They accumulated food,

Professor Emeritus, Economics, The University of Western Ontario; Adjunct Professor,
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Werewolves; and Past President of the Canadian Law and Economics Association. The author
gratefully acknowledges advice and assistance from Lydia Miljan, Matthew Palmer, Paula
Nicholls, Jason Childs, Jason Keenan, and John Henderson (who argues that the collective noun
for zombies is “An Apocalypse of Zombies”).
1 See for example, The Long Loud Silence (1952, biological warfare); No Blade of Grass (1958,
crop and food disaster); Lucifer’s Hammer (1978, meteor strike). Also see, World War Z (2006,
Zombie invasion) for lesser examples, as the apocalypse is less dramatic. Pride and Prejudice
and Zombies (2009) does not fit this mold because there was no near-apocalypse in that novel.
Alternatively, although there was a total apocalypse in On the Beach (1957, nuclear holocaust),
there was no breakdown in law and order because government remained intact.
2 On risk averse behaviour, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_aversion
3 In economics jargon, they have a low time preference.
*
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water, water filters, camping equipment, etc. Others, who were not prepared, found
themselves desperate enough to try to take food and supplies from those who had the
supplies. Understandably, those who had the supplies defended themselves.
Interestingly, many of the people who saved and were better situated to deal with
a disaster were not well-prepared for dealing with the onslaught from those who were less
well-prepared. In nearly every scenario, those who were prepared (either by luck or good
planning) had to fight off marauding bands of those who were unprepared. The
government was unable to protect them or enforce their private property rights because
the government and all official forms of law and order had completely collapsed. Those
who more fully anticipated the problem were prepared not just with food, water, and
shelter, but also with weapons to protect their caches of supplies. Others, with no weapons
and no support or protection from law enforcement agencies, lost their supplies and often
their lives to those who had sufficient weaponry to take the supplies.
Slowly, but inevitably, the system of property rights and contract enforcement to
which we have become accustomed in the western world deteriorated. And as the fighting
for control of scarce resources occurred, there were two inevitable results:
1. Scarce, potentially productive resources were diverted from the production of goods
and services to the production of theft activities; and some were diverted to provide
protection from theft. Farmers had to arm themselves and spend time (as well as
hire others) to protect their crops from marauders. Non-farmers had similar
problems, protecting their caches of supplies from the marauders.
2. Strongmen analogous to crime lords emerged through the strength of their bodies
and their personalities, as well as their willingness to use brute strength to acquire
control of resources. In some instances, where law enforcement agencies still
existed, they tended to become the decision-makers in the face of panic and
scarcity; in others, the monopoly over the use of force devolved to whomever could
form a coalition strong enough to retain that control.
The problem with most of these scenarios is that rarely do they address the
continuing evolution of the struggle for power and the use of property rights and contract
enforcement in the post-zombie apocalypse [PZA]. Unlike the other papers presented in
this session, this paper deals specifically with the PZA and considers these important
political, legal, and economic issues under various PZA outcomes.

75 | P a g e

To understand the nature of legal and economic institutions that might evolve or
survive after the zombie apocalypse, one is forced to surmise how the apocalypse would
occur and what type(s) of zombies would cause the zombie apocalypse.
2. SCENARIO ONE
In one scenario, the zombies attain complete control over the Rest Of Us Non-Zombies
[ROUNZ]. Initially, the zombies would face a common-property resource problem4 and the
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), as they eat the brains of the ROUNZ without
regard for sustainability. Once the supply of brains from all the ROUNZ is fully depleted,
either the zombies would die out from lack of sustenance or the zombies would begin
attacking and eating other animals or each other.
This state seems to be about as far as many stories about the zombie apocalypse
ever go (with few exceptions) primarily because in most versions of what happens during
the zombie apocalypse, zombies have no frontal lobes, have no ability to organize, and
have no thinking leaders. In some of these scenarios, the zombies eat all the human brains
and then begin cannibalizing each other until all the zombies are gone.
In other versions, albeit rare ones, the initial chaos without a system of
entitlements leads to the emergence of strongmen-zombies who control other zombies. For
example, in I am Legend (Matheson, 2007), the zombies have actually become the
dominant species while the human race is all but extinct, and there are some stronger
zombies that act almost like herd leaders. Through the use of their own personal force,
they acquire a monopoly over the use of force overall for enforcement of their rules.
Warring zombie strongmen battle for the right to control territory and zombie underlings;
they battle for control over the common property resource – ROUNZ brains. Much of the
leadership for this type of control would undoubtedly come from the existing leadership
within the Zombie hordes. From an evolutionary perspective (sometimes referred to as a
spreading virus in various zombie depictions), those zombies that mutate and control
other zombies to provide for sustainable supplies of ROUNZ brains will emerge as the
dominant subspecies of zombies. Even in this simplified scenario, it becomes clear that the
emergence of a strong, dominant force to create and enforce property rights or entitlements
is key to the continued sustainability of the group.
In this scenario, zombies eventually adapt, as if they learn that they must
conserve, and ultimately they develop a system of ownership rights, hunting rights, and

4
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exchange rules. Some actually develop and acquire rights to hunting preserves, while
others domesticate and cultivate the ROUNZ.
3. SCENARIO TWO
In the second scenario, zombies and ROUNZ develop a kind of unpeaceful, uneasy coexistence. The zombies raid the ROUNZ settlements either constantly or when they are
hungry for more brains, but the Zombies never completely conquer the ROUNZ. During
the early massive, surprise attacks, the zombies cause an apocalypse for the ROUNZ…
their legal, social, cultural, business, and military infrastructures are destroyed.
The result is the emergence of two distinct societies: zombies and ROUNZ, each
facing different challenges. The zombies would not be able to treat the ROUNZ as cattle,
as they would in one of the variants of Scenario One. Instead the Zombies would need to
develop strategies, as well as reward and incentive systems to make their hunting/raiding
expeditions more effective. Successful strategies would lead to the growth of some bands
of zombies, and unsuccessful strategies will lead to the demise of other bands of zombies.
If the zombies do not evolve some sort of structure, they will eventually be
defeated, as appears to be the likely outcome in World War Z. If the zombies do, however,
develop some sort of structure, then the result could well be something analogous to the
Eloi and the Morlocks in H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine (1895).
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4. THIS STUDY – DEALING WITH THE NEAR APOCALYPSE
This study focuses primarily on the effects of a partial or near apocalypse in which the
zombies are held at bay and/or completely conquered after nearly destroying the ROUNZ.
4.1. ORGANIZING DEFENCE
One of the initial requirements (and clamoured-for services) for the ROUNZ is defence.
The ROUNZ require defence against the seemingly never-ending onslaught of zombies
initially and against marauding bands of other ROUNZ later, as the search for food and
shelter continues. But defence requires scarce resources: armaments, people, and
organizational skills in addition to the basic food, clothing, and shelter requirements.
Many communities and households will have some armaments in place for dealing
with the zombies. Hammers, rifles, pistols, slingshots, etc., as well as flame equipment
seem to work well. But eventually the ammunition and fuel for the weapons begins to run
out. More ammunition and additional or alternative weapons, must be either produced or
otherwise procured via theft/marauding. Organizing the production and/or acquisition of
the armaments requires that individuals interact with each other via some reliable
mechanism to assure that promises are kept and commitments are honoured.
Similarly, when people move beyond simple self-sufficiency, on their own or within
a family or very small community, they make agreements about how to share out the
work. In the case of armaments, people will organize to produce the ammunition, repair
weapons, produce new weapons, form raiding parties, and provide defence for their own
groups. As people have had to learn time and again, through the ages, when people come
together to provide for anything, including defence, they must determine who does what,
and who receives what compensation for providing the goods and services. The initial
allocations are often based on sharing and equal division. But as people living in
communes inevitably discover, problems of shirking and favouritism emerge (Palmer,
2007). Eventually, the successful communities and groups realize that people shirk less
and produce more when they receive rewards according to the value of their services.
At first, there are caches of armaments. These armouries are sometimes treated
as common property, for all to use according to their self-perceived needs. Over time, the
weapons fall into disrepair; if something is broken, it is often easy just to discard it and
replace it with something else from the common pool. Only if some vague form of
entitlements and responsibilities is created and enforced do people have an incentive to
care for the weapons. Culture and tradition can play a large role in creating these
entitlements and responsibilities, but somehow they emerge.
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Organization of the defence effort can be complex. People must emerge as trusted,
respected leaders one way or another. Sometimes the roles are filled by people with
leadership-type charismatic personalities; other times bullies emerge following battles
against the zombies. These leaders have certain (usually limited) authority and power to
make decisions. They create and enforce rights and responsibilities within their realm of
authority.
To the extent that the leaders create rights and entitlements based on
productiveness, their realm will more likely be successful in defending itself
against zombies and marauders. To the extent that the leaders use favouritism or
other criteria for creating these rights, their realms will be less likely to be
successful.
If the leaders reward productivity, people will strive to become more productive.
If, however, the leaders mete out rewards according favouritism, people will strive to
become favourites of the leaders. And if the leaders reward according their own standards
of attractiveness, people will strive to meet those standards of attractiveness. As the
standard economics phrase goes, “People respond to incentives.”
4.2 ORGANIZING COMMUNICATIONS
As the zombie apocalypse threatens humans, isolated pockets of people will want to
communicate with others about successful and unsuccessful defence techniques, as well
as about unified defence strategies. They will also want to organize mechanisms for trade
and exchange.
In the era of cellular telephones and the internet, this process seems straightforward. However, local service provision will be necessary, as will the maintenance of
communications and communication protocols. Also, the provision of electrical energy to
power the local services and the individual communication devices will be crucial.
Undoubtedly on smaller scales, solar and wind power, along with gas generators will be
in heavy demand, assuming the major sources of electrical power cannot withstand the
zombie onslaught. Yet even these sources of power require scarce resources for their
construction and maintenance; those already in place will not last forever and will surely
be the targets for marauding tribes. Production will at some point be necessary, a fact
rarely dealt with in many apocalyptic novels.
4.3 PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES
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Among the surviving ROUNZ, food and energy supplies eventually will be depleted. Some
people will have hoarded more than others, just in general out of a strong sense of
insurance against the unknown or out of a strong religious belief. But eventually their
sources of food and other products will be depleted. Acquisition of new goods and services
must eventually occur to stave off a complete apocalypse, whether the acquisition is by
production or by marauding and taking the goods from other communities or legal entities
(possibly including slaves). How this acquisition will be organized may vary. In some
communities, the organization could well be communal, but we have learned time and
again that communal organization of production is unsuccessful. One outstanding
example is provided by Bradford’s account of what happened in the Plymouth colony in
The United States from 1620-1622 (Palmer, 2007):
One of the traditions the Pilgrims had brought with them from England was a
practice known as ``farming in common.'' Everything they produced was put into
a common pool; the harvest was rationed among them according to need. …
They had thought ``that the taking away of property, and bringing in community
into a common wealth, would make them happy and flourishing,'' Bradford
recounts.
They were wrong. ``For this community (so far as it was) was found to breed
much confusion and discontent, and retard much imployment that would have
been to their benefite and comforte,'' Bradford writes.
Young, able-bodied men resented working for others without compensation. They
thought it an ``injuestice'' to receive the same allotment of food and clothing as
those who didn't pull their weight. What they lacked were proper incentives.
After the Pilgrims had endured near-starvation for three winters, Bradford
decided to experiment when it came time to plant in the spring of 1623. He set
aside a plot of land for each family, that ``they should set corne every man for his
owne perticuler, and in that regard trust to themselves.''
The results were nothing short of miraculous.
Bradford writes: ``This had very good success; for it made all hands very
industrious, so as much more corne was planted than other waise would have
bene by any means the Govr or any other could use, and saved him a great deall
of trouble, and gave far better content.''
The women now went willingly into the field, carrying their young children on
their backs. Those who previously claimed they were too old or ill to work
embraced the idea of private property and enjoyed the fruits of their labor,
eventually producing enough to trade their excess corn for furs and other desired
commodities.
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More recent examples include inter alia the myriad stories of inefficient and
misdirected production under the communist systems of the USSR and China. Others
would include pre-Thatcher nationalization of industries in the UK; and the most recent
examples are the tragedies of government non-market directed production, all
purportedly for the common good in Zimbabwe and Venezuela. All these examples follow
the pattern set out by George Orwell so effectively in Animal Farm (1946). Venezuela is
an especially timely example of the reduction in production that occurs when property
rights are not clear and when the flux of legal entitlements create such uncertainty that
people turn inward, producing and trading less and less as the uncertainty grows.
4.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIALIZATION AND TRADE
The provision of even basic goods and services for survival is nearly impossible within a
single family. As families begin to realize this, they regroup into communities where they
can specialize in the production of some things and trade for others. This trade happens
quite naturally and develops fairly quickly. And, to the extent there is no fraud or duress,
trade makes all parties better off. They become more productive as they develop their
comparative advantages.5
So long as the trading partners are within a fairly small community, there is little
need for formal declaration of property rights and legal enforcement. Reputation effects
go a long way to providing the type of enforcement of contractual agreements that is
usually necessary. When someone knows “his word is as good as his bond”, that knowledge
(or expectation) creates a quasi-legal environment in which people can trade fairly
smoothly and efficiently. But when the trading community is larger, defections from
common arrangements are more likely to occur; strangers are, on average, viewed as less
trustworthy.
For trade and exchange to occur efficiently and effectively, two conditions must be
satisfied:
1. Transaction and negotiation costs must be low, i.e. the cost of making a deal or
exchange must be low. If the parties have to wrangle at length, or if the parties
must bring armed guards with them to protect their goods, then fewer deals will
be made that would have been good deals for both parties in the absence of high
transaction costs.
2. Property rights, or more generally legal entitlements, must be well-established
and easily enforced. If I make an agreement with you, we both must have ways of
In Economics, the term “comparative advantage” has a very precise meaning; roughly it means
producing those things you’re comparatively best at even if others are better in some absolute
sense. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_advantage
5
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knowing that both trading partners have the right to exchange whatever it is we
are exchanging, and we must be fairly confident that both parties will honour the
agreement. The evolution of property law and contract law has occurred for this
very reason: to make a deal, people want to know the deal will go through as
expected. To the extent that they have serious doubts about whether the deal will
go through as expected, they will make fewer exchanges, leading to lower values
of production for the community as a whole.6
After the apocalypse, somehow legal entitlements are created. Some traditions and
cultural values are carried forward into the post-apocalypse societies, but people quickly
learn that “It’s different now.”7 The old societal and legal norms break down. Laws become
unenforceable and unenforced. The resulting chaos leads to a dramatic reduction in
productive activity as people shift their efforts and resources away from production and
toward theft, marauding, and defence. What is astounding about so many of the
apocalypse stories, such as The Walking Dead, is that the old norms seem to be in place
much longer than one would reasonably expect. In the instance cited with the phrase, “I
don’t think those rules apply anymore, do you?” a woman is considering shoplifting an
item from a store. Yet with the breakdown of law and order, it would be very surprising
if such stores existed for long without armed guards and/or without the protection of some
godfather or other force.
In general, without a formal system in place to define and enforce property rights
and other legal entitlements, other mechanisms will evolve to take their place. Typically
in novels and movies about the apocalypse, bullies and strongmen begin to take over,
assuming control. Not unlike the mafia, individuals seek the assistance of these bullies
or strongmen to help settle disputes and to create a new form of legal entitlements. If two
people cannot agree on who has the right to use a certain resource, they seek adjudication
of the dispute by their leader. If they cannot agree on what the terms of a contract were
and whether it was honoured, they seek resolution by appealing to their leader. In
exchange for providing these services, the leaders receive (or take!) compensation from
their followers in some form, such as tributes, taxes, fees, share-cropping, sexual favours,
etc.

Many readers will recognize these two points as a restatement of what has come to be known as
“The Coase Theorem” although it was not set forth quite so succinctly by Coase (1960) in his
famous article on social costs. To set the record straight, the Coase Theorem is not, as I
incorrectly asserted in an earlier presentation of this paper, named after the famous economist
who devised it, Professor Theorem.
7 “It’s different now,” is a short-form summary of the title, “I don’t think those rules apply
anymore, do you? Rebuilding civilization after the Zombie Apocalypse,” the keynote address of
the conference, delivered by David Bright.
6
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Another example of this emergence of strongmen and bullies is seen in the
development of prison gangs and enforcers in the absence of enforcement of strong rules
by prison officials:
“First, when officials do not govern effectively, informal prisoner institutions play
a more important role. Prisoners fill the gap in governance left by delinquent
officials. When officials do their jobs well, such as in Norway, prisoners have
little need to self-organize. Second, prison gangs do a good job of regulating the
underground economy, but they are not always the most efficient source of
governance. As earlier studies showed, ostracism is effective in small, tight-knit
communities, but these decentralized punishments are ineffective in large
populations of strangers. As a result, in large prison systems, prisoners turn to
gangs to create rules, threaten more severe punishments, and to facilitate order
…. In small prison systems, prisoners do not need gangs to do so. They can easily
do it on their own….” (Emily Skarbek, 2016, who concludes with the following
quotation from David Skarbek, 2016):
‘Prison populations are comprised of a biased agent type, forced to
interact with each other, with no exit options, and sometimes living in
desperate poverty. Nevertheless, this article shows that inmates can
develop effective (albeit far from ideal) solutions to the problem of order,
and these solutions take diverse forms depending on official's choices and
the demographics of the community. Extralegal governance is not only
possible, but is often robust to significant difficulties.’
In some other communities, a more republican or democratic type of control might
emerge quickly, with a group of leaders who use their authority to create institutions that
have authority to define and enforce legal entitlements and to adjudicate disputes.
Either way, however, or no matter how else the system might evolve, only to the
extent that some system is created can the conditions necessary for economic growth be
met. And it is those communities with more rapid economic growth that will be more
likely to thrive, more likely to be able to defend themselves, and more likely to ward off
threats from other, marauding communities. Only if people develop a trust that their
property can be developed and worked with little threat, only if people believe that their
agreements will be enforced if necessary, only then will people begin to redeploy their
scarce resources away from theft, confiscation, and marauding and toward more
productive activities.
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5. REGIME UNCERTAINTY
In order that trust in property rights and contract enforcement be maintained, the
successful communities will be those that minimize the degree of uncertainty about that
enforcement. If property rights are enforced but cannot be counted on to be strong and
stable, people will divert some of their time, energy, and resources to trying to make them
more stable. To be more specific, if people think their leaders can be swayed by political,
financial, or other entreaties to abrogate past property-rights decisions, then not only will
their property rights be perceived as less stable, but (and more importantly for this
argument) people will respond to those perceived incentives by using more of their scarce
resources to attempt to influence the political decisions, thus leaving fewer resources
available for production of goods and services. Put bluntly, lobbyists could otherwise be
growing food or planting flowers if there weren’t high expected pay-offs to the lobbying
activity. Recasting this argument in the PZA setting, people will have an incentive to seek
favours from their leaders if they believe the leaders can be influenced by their
behaviour.8 And by doing so, they will be detracting from the productive output of food,
defence, or any other good for the community.
It is this realization that regime uncertainty can, and usually does, lead to
economic inefficiency that helps us understand why the PZA communities with tyrants or
demagogues as leaders may survive effectively in the short-run but will be more likely to
struggle in the longer run. Communities ruled by tyrants or demagogues generally face
considerably more long-run regime uncertainty than do those with elected leaders or with
leaders who eschew random favouritism for the sake of longer-term goals for their
communities.
Unfortunately, in most apocalyptic settings, strongmen emerge as the leaders.
They tend to be the most ruthless in seeking power, and they use brutal alliances to
maintain their power. The pockets of humans who survive and fight off the zombie attacks
closely resemble the fiefdoms of the dark and middle ages, with a concentration of power
in the leaders of the local communities. The resemblance continues with these pockets or
communities or fiefdoms battling each other for power and for the control of resources.
When there is chaos and uncertainty and when the normal channels for
community decision-making are disrupted, the conditions are ripe for strongmen tyrants
and demagogues to emerge. They will “get things done”, and some will be successful,
The social and economic benefits of the perceived stability of property rights, contract
enforcement rules, and other legal entitlements helps explain the comparative successes of those
entities which place a higher emphasis on stare decisis in the rule of law.
8
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making decisions that help fend off the zombies and other fiefdoms. Even in societies or
communities with a long history of non-exploitative power, things change rapidly in the
face of looming disasters. In these instances, which will be common during the zombie
attacks and during the PZA, those who can create some semblance of stability will also
tend to create some degree of certainty about property rights and contract enforcement.
Fighting the zombies and marauding neighbours will, of course, be time- and resourceconsuming, and so the leaders will need simple rules to adjudicate property and contract
disputes. One common set of rules that emerges in many apocalyptic settings is twofold:
1. Might makes right. Whoever has the power wins the dispute. The godfather, the
king, the lord of the manor is too busy with the wars to adjudicate disputes. Lower
levels of lords, lieutenants, or senior executives will adjudicate the disputes and
be open to influence from the disputing parties.
2. The top leaders of the communities will tend to be careful to select deputies they
can trust to make effective short-run decisions to win wars and maintain power
with little concern for long-run economic efficiencies.
3. Property rights and contract enforcement will often be left to the parties
themselves to settle, either using force (duels, in a more formal setting; also titfor-tat or other strategies), or using reputation effects.
So long as time, energy, and resources are devoted to fighting attackers, the
attention paid to civil disputes will be abbreviated. Some pockets, some communities will
evolve systems that rely heavily on the character and personality of their leaders. These
will tend to be the communities led by tyrants and demagogues. These communities will
appear to be successful in the sense of “Mussolini made the trains run on time”; they will
have certainty and they will likely be effective, at least initially, in warfare. But because
they have extreme vesting of power in the executive, they will also be less efficient in the
longer run production of goods and services: residents (subjects) will be producing fewer
goods and services and devoting more scarce resources to currying favour with the
executive.
In the longer run, those communities that evolve away from extreme centralized
control will be more likely to be successful.9 They will be more productive in the longer
run, and this increased productivity will tend to have numerous longer-term payoffs for
their communities:
1. They will have more and better food, clothing and shelter.

Careful readers will notice the exorbitant use of hedge words and phrases, such as “likely”,
“might”, and “tend to”. The use of these words and phrases indicates the probabilistic nature of
the views set forth here.
9
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2. They will have a greater productive capacity to produce more armaments for
waging war.
3. They will have more decentralized decision-making, leading to less favouritism
and more meritocratic decision-making.
Of course there could, and likely will be, exceptions. Brutal, centralized dynasties
have persisted at times for centuries. But regardless of the form of government, typically
those societies that have survived and even thrived are those in which the legal
entitlements are clear and stable and in which contract enforcement is carried out with
generally known rules and outcomes.
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